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**Triumph, Sponsors, and the Future  
of Aerospace**

Yale Mergers and Acquisitions Club  
Fall 2025 Industrials Report

## I. Context

### *A. Introduction*

On the 3rd of February, 2025, Berkshire Partners and Warburg Pincus, two American private equity firms, announced their intention to acquire the Triumph Group, an American aerospace parts manufacturer, for \$3.05B. This report will analyze the deal and unpack its implications.

### *B. About Triumph*

Triumph Group, founded in 1993 and headquartered in Radnor, Pennsylvania, is a manufacturer of integrated systems and components for the aviation industry. The company designs, engineers, manufactures, repairs, and overhauls a broad portfolio of aerospace and defense systems and structures. Its clients and partners include original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), as well as a variety of military and commercial aircraft operators through the aircraft life cycle.

Triumph’s products can be broken down into two operating segments: (i) Triumph Systems & Support and (ii) Triumph Interiors. Companies under Triumph’s Systems & Support segment develop proprietary components and systems, produce assemblies using external designs, and provide life cycle solutions for commercial, regional, and military aircraft. Products include landing gear-system designs, hydraulic power generation and control, and suites of aerospace gearbox solutions (10K, pg. 4). This segment represents 89% of total revenue (\$1.118 billion in FY2025, up 9% year-over-year) and manufactures proprietary aerospace components including:

- Hydraulic, mechanical, and electromechanical actuation systems
- Engine accessory gearboxes and helicopter transmissions
- Primary and secondary flight controls (hydromechanical and electromechanical)
- Active and passive thermal solutions technology
- Landing gear actuation systems and components

The Interiors segment contributes 11% of revenue (\$143.6 million FY2025, down 13% due to Boeing production impacts) and supplies:

- Thermo-acoustic insulation systems
- Environmental control system (ECS) composite ducting
- Floor panels for Boeing 737 NG, 737 MAX, 747, 767 Freighter/Tanker

- Thermoplastic interior assemblies
- Other aircraft interior components

In 2025, Triumph Group was acquired by Warburg Pincus and Berkshire Partners, two global private equity firms, and taken private. Under private ownership, Triumph is expected to strengthen its position as a highly-valued aerospace and defense supplier, pursuing operational simplification, cost discipline, and improved capital allocation, with a focus on higher-margin, proprietary systems and long-term aftermarket revenue streams.

## II. Deal overview

### *A. Deal terms*

Triumph Group was acquired by Berkshire Partners and Warburg Pincus through a \$2.85 billion all cash public-to-private LBO in July 2025. The deal had an implied enterprise value of \$2.73 billion and was financed with \$1.848 billion term loan, \$125 million delayed draw term loan, and \$250 million revolver, representing roughly 49% of leverage at close, with a maximum initial drawdown of 66% leverage. The acquisition resulted in Warburg Pincus and Berkshire Partners acquiring 100% ownership of the company. Based on trailing EBITDA, the deal implied an EV/EBITDA multiple of 16.6, at a moderate premium to aerospace sector comps.

### *B. Drivers/Strategic Rationale*

We believe that Berkshire and Warburg Pincus' acquisition of Triumph is a bet on the sustained growth of the US aerospace industry, Berkshire's pre-rumor undervaluation relative to peers, and the sponsors' ability to meaningfully add operational and capital structure improvements.

The US aerospace parts industry is projected to expand at a CAGR of 4.9% over the next 5 years. This is driven by favorable tailwinds to both military and commercial aviation. The commercial original equipment manufacturer (OEM) market, which makes up 41.3% of Triumph's net sales, is currently supply bottlenecked, with a global shortage amounting to roughly 2000 planes. This is likely to lead to high demand for aeroplanes in the medium term which will benefit Triumph's top line. Triumph is particularly expected to benefit from a rebound in Boeing 737 sales after the program's high profile safety failures, which we estimate will increase Triumph's annual revenue by \$242M by 2030.

The US aftermarket repair and maintenance industry is also expected to grow healthily, although at a slower rate. Demand in the repair market is primarily driven by aircraft utilization, as higher flight hours accelerate wear and increase maintenance requirements. Global commercial passenger traffic is projected to grow at a 3.4% CAGR through 2030, continuing the industry's recovery following its sharp contraction experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. This recovery is expected to drive approximately 3.2% annual market growth over the same period.

Triumph is also expected to benefit heavily from defense sector tailwinds. The FY25 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which authorizes \$883.7 billion in discretionary spending, places increased emphasis on fleet modernization. This growth in aviation spending is expected to continue as the US contends with challenges to its air force dominance in an era of great power competition. While slower than some other sectors, government aviation spending is expected to grow at a CAGR of 4.7% through 2030. We expect that this will benefit both Triumph's military OEM and military aftermarket businesses, which comprise 16.2% and 16.6% of revenue respectively.

Triumph thus benefits from general aerospace market tailwinds, and is expected to be particularly buoyed by the recovery of the Boeing 737 program. Triumph was valued more cheaply than its peers prior to its acquisition. In October 2024, shortly before rumors of Triumph's acquisition became public, Triumph traded at an EV/EBITDA multiple of 13.6, which is below the industry average of 14.9 for medium sized US aerospace parts manufacturers. This was despite the fact that Triumph's margins and growth prospects were largely in line with industry peers. We thus believe that it was likely that the sponsors wanted to capitalize on the fact that Triumph was trading below its fundamentals.

Finally, there are a number of capital structure and operational improvements which we expect the sponsors would have wanted to bring to Triumph. At the time of acquisition, Triumph was unsustainably overlevered, with \$1.225 billion of debt including unfunded pension liabilities, relative to a pre-rumor market cap of \$1.02 billion. This debt to equity ratio far exceeded industry peers, for whom the norm is debt comprising 10-25% of equity value. Of particular concern was Triumph's most senior debt, 958 million (as of March 2025) of secured first lien notes, which were due to mature in 2028. With Triumph having only paid off \$127 million of debt in the 12 months before March 2025, they had little chance of repaying this debt without any kind of refinancing or external recapitalization. The 2028 notes also imposed serious operating and financial restrictions on Triumph which limited its ability to invest in R&D or new growth areas. Berkshire and Warburg Pincus, in acquiring Triumph and wiping its capital structure, gave it the ability to refinance its debt, loosen its covenants, and grow an otherwise relatively healthy core operating asset.

We also estimate that the sponsors expect margin uplift in their acquisition of Triumph. While their core operating thesis is not publicly available, we can backsolve their value creation efforts based on probable IRR goals. With our base revenue assumptions, we forecast that the sponsors would need to increase Triumph's EBITDA margins to 18.1%, up 220 basis points, to achieve 20% IRR by 2030. Possible sources of margin expansion include SG&A optimization by streamlining administrative processes, and COGS optimization by negotiating better terms/volume discounts with suppliers, standardizing best practices across sites, and increasing throughput on existing capacity.

### **III. Valuation**

#### ***A. Operating Model***

Our revenue build assumes that Triumph's revenue from the 787 and 737 programs, its two largest cashflow generators, will increase proportionally with the number of planes being built each year. Meanwhile, we looked at market growth rates to estimate the other growth of Triumph's sales across the commercial and defense verticals. This implies that Triumph's revenues will grow rapidly by 14% in 2025, before gradually tapering off to 5% 2030.

We assume a slight uptick in capex from 2% to 3% as Triumph is freed from its first lien debt covenants and consequently able to invest in growth. However, given the nature of an LBO, we still expect Triumph to remain relatively capex light. Otherwise, we assume Triumph's costs and net working capital scale proportionately with revenue, while also outlining alternative growth scenarios relative to our base case, with particular emphasis on potential EBITDA margin expansion initiatives the sponsors are likely to pursue (see Appendix). We forecast that D&A will increase immediately post acquisition and then level off, driven by the write up of intangibles post-acquisition and their subsequent amortization. We find that a 20% IRR is realistic with operational improvements, and a 25% IRR is possible, although unlikely.

#### ***B. LBO***

Our LBO model assumes that Triumph's cost of debt will increase gradually over the next few years as interest rates decrease. We also assume that 1% of the overall debt load will be spent on financing fees, and that 2% of Triumph's enterprise value will be spent on transaction fees. We also assume that Triumph and Warburg Pincus will hold Triumph until 2030, at which point they will exit at the same 16.2x multiple at which they acquired Triumph.

Without operational improvement, our model suggests that Warburg and Berkshire's investment will yield only 15.8% IRR. However, with value creation levers, this improves significantly. If the sponsors are able to increase Triumph's EBITDA margin to 18% (from 15.9%), we forecast that their IRR will increase to 20.4%. If they increase Triumph's EBITDA margin to 19%, this gets to 22.2%, and IRRs could get even higher with multiple expansion or further revenue growth.

#### IV. Risks

There are meaningful risks which could prevent the sponsors achieving their project IRR. Firstly, the sponsors may find it difficult to exit Triumph, because Triumph's highly specialized aerospace structures and aftermarket capabilities narrows its pool of potential strategic buyers, and the sponsors may want to avoid the risks associated with taking Triumph public via an IPO. Triumph also has a high customer concentration, with Boeing alone comprising 23% of net sales in 2025. While no other customer comprises more than 10% of net sales, any of Triumph's customers leaving would significantly affect its long-term revenues. If Boeing were to switch away from Triumph as a supplier or itself face production challenges, for instance due to another grounding of 737s, this would dramatically impact Triumph's top line sales.

Like many suppliers in the highly competitive aerospace value chain, Triumph faces sustained pricing pressure from downstream OEMs. It competes against significantly larger, more diversified suppliers such as Collins Aerospace, Honeywell Aerospace, Parker Hannifin, and Safran, which benefit from greater scale. Although the risk of a sudden loss of business is limited by the long-term nature of aerospace contracts, end producers such as Boeing, Airbus, and major engine OEMs are far more concentrated than their upstream suppliers and therefore possess greater bargaining power. This imbalance enables OEMs to exert downward pressure on supplier pricing. As a result, Triumph may face margin compression and, in some cases, reduced sales volumes.

A large share of Triumph's sales are also derived from long-term fixed price contracts. This makes Triumph particularly vulnerable to inflationary pressures, which in an uncertain geopolitical landscape is a significant present risk. This pressure would likely, as in any LBO, be accentuated by higher debt repayment costs as interest rates go up to combat such inflation.

Triumph also may experience disruptions to its supply chains, which consist of raw materials such as metallics and composites, purchased machined components, engineered component parts, and special processes. Due to the highly controlled nature of the aerospace industry, Triumph often only has single customer-approved sources of components. As a result, Triumph is highly dependent on the

performance of its upstream suppliers. While this can be mitigated by keeping greater inventories of components, this would increase net working capital (NWC) and negatively impact the sponsors' returns. We estimate that a 25% increase in NWC would correspond to a 0.5% decrease in the sponsors' IRR.

Triumph's supply chain also may be disrupted by tariffs or other trade barriers. However, the aerospace industry is a relative bright spot in the industrial landscape when considering tariffs because its supply chains are largely domestic. Both Triumph's suppliers and customers are overwhelmingly based in the US, limiting the risk of trade barriers.

Finally, commercial aerospace is highly cyclical. While the current upcycle is likely to endure in the near to medium term, supported by a global aircraft supply shortage, commercial OEM sales are far from the mission critical stable cash flows preferable in an LBO. Defense exposure provides some countercyclical, and commercial aftermarket revenues tend to be relatively stable. However, commercial OEM sales still account for 41% of Triumph's revenue, leaving the business exposed if the cycle turns.

## **V. Key takeaways**

Berkshire's acquisition of Triumph highlights the expected strength of the US aerospace industry over the next few years. It is one of a string of similar deals, including Apollo Global Management's acquisition of Barnes Group and Cerberus Capital Management's acquisition of Votaw Precision Technologies, and a bright spot in a relatively uncertain 2025 Industrials landscape. The deal also illustrates how a company's capital structure issues can provide an opening for opportunistic acquirers, who can recapitalize them on more favorable terms. However, customer and supplier concentration, vulnerability to macroeconomic volatility, and a lack of clear exit strategies means that the deal is not without its risks. Time will tell how it performs.

## Appendix: Models

### LBO

Model Assumptions	
<b>Entry Valuation</b>	
Entry LTM EBITDA	<b>\$180,640</b>
(x) Entry Multiple	16.6x
<b>Purchase Enterprise Value</b>	<b>\$2,998,624</b>
Less: Debt	(\$972,699)
Less: Unfunded Pension Liabilities	(\$277,600)
Plus: Cash	277,164
<b>Equity Value</b>	<b>\$2,025,489</b>
<b>Transaction</b>	
LTM Exit Multiple	17.0x
Tax Rate	21%
Cash to B/S	(\$169,919)
Transaction Expenses	\$59,972
<b>Debt</b>	<b>EBITDA (x)</b>
Total Leverage	8.0x
Term Loan	\$1,480,000
Delayed Draw Term Loan	\$125,000
Revolver Capacity	\$250,000
	SOFR+ Floor
	Rate
	Fee (%)
	Fee (\$)
	Year
	4.00%
	8%
	1.00%
	14,800
	2025
	4.00%
	8%
	1.00%
	1,250
	2027
	4.00%
	8%
	1.00%
	2,500
	2025
Sources & Uses	
<b>Sources</b>	<b>Uses</b>
Term Loan	Purchase Equity Value
<b>Total Debt</b>	<b>\$2,025,489</b>
	Refinancing Net Debt (incl Pension Liabilities)
Cash from Balance Sheet	1,250,299
Equity Investment	169,919
<b>Total Sources</b>	<b>\$3,520,480</b>
	Underwriting Fees
	Transaction Expenses
	59,972
	<b>Total Uses</b>
	<b>\$3,520,480</b>
Goodwill Calculation	
Purchase Equity Value	\$2,025,489
Less: Book Value of Equity	(76,446)
Plus: Existing Goodwill	512,342
<b>Step-Up of Equity</b>	<b>\$2,614,277</b>
Less: Write-Up of Intangible Assets	(130,714)
Plus: Deferred Tax Liability	(27,450)
<b>Pro Forma Goodwill</b>	<b>\$2,456,113</b>
	% of
	<b>Step-Up</b>
	5.0%
	21.0%
	Years
	15 Years
	Annual
	\$8,714
	15 Years
	(1,830)

## Closing Balance Sheet

	Pre- Transaction	Debits	Credits	Pro Forma
Cash	\$277,164	\$169,919	(\$277,164)	\$169,919
Accounts Receivable	154,888			154,888
Contract Assets	69,752			69,752
Inventory	357,323			357,323
Prepaid Expenses	19,736			19,736
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>\$878,863</b>	<b>\$169,919</b>	<b>(\$277,164)</b>	<b>\$771,618</b>
Property, Plant & Equipment	\$154,538			\$154,538
Goodwill	512,342	1,943,771		2,456,113
Intangible Assets	56,191	130,714		186,905
Other Assets	24,994			24,994
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>\$1,626,928</b>	<b>\$2,244,404</b>	<b>(\$277,164)</b>	<b>\$3,594,168</b>
Accounts Payable	\$162,917			\$162,917
Accrued Liabilities	\$ 144,747.00			144,747
Contract Liabilities	78,430			78,430
Current Portion of Long Term Debt	8,984		(8,984)	--
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>\$395,078</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>\$307,664</b>
Current Portion of Long Term Debt	\$963,715		(963,715)	--
Revolver	--	--	--	--
Delayed Draw Term Loan	--	--	--	--
Accrued Pensions	277,509	--	--	277,509
Deferred Income Taxes	7,268	--	--	7,268
Term Loan	--	1,480,000	--	1,480,000
Other noncurrent liabilities	59,804	--	--	59,804
<b>Total Debt Outstanding</b>	<b>\$1,308,296</b>	<b>\$1,480,000</b>	<b>(\$963,715)</b>	<b>\$1,824,581</b>
Capitalized Financing Fees	--	37,100		37,100
Deferred Tax Liability	--	27,450		\$27,450
Shareholder Equity	(\$76,446)	\$1,781,483		\$1,705,037
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b>\$1,626,928</b>	<b>\$1,846,033</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>\$3,594,168</b>

## Revenue Build

Fiscal Year	2024A	2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E
<b>737 Program</b>							
Boeing 737 Sales	265	447	537	604	693	688	701
Share of Revenue from Boeing 737 Program	9%	14%	16%	17%	18%	18%	18%
Est Revenue Per Plane	428.59	437.16	445.91	454.82	463.92	473.20	482.66
Overall Revenue	113,576.58	195,411.72	239,451.49	274,713.73	321,496.93	325,560.88	338,346.71
Revenue Growth (YoY)		106%	23%	15%	17%	1%	4%
<b>787 Program</b>							
Boeing 787 Sales	73	84	102	120	131	140	147
Share of Revenue from Boeing 787 Program	8%	9%	10%	11%	11%	12%	12%
Est Revenue Per Plane	1,382.97	1,411	1,439	1,468	1,497	1,527	1,557
Overall Revenue	100,957	118,493	146,762	176,115	196,104	213,768	228,945
Revenue Growth (YoY)		24%	24%	20%	11%	9%	7%
<b>Other Commercial OEM</b>							
Revenue	307,824.46	319,830	336,461	353,957	372,362	391,725	412,095
Est Rev Growth (YoY)	6%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%	5.20%
<b>Other Military OEM</b>							
Revenue	273,846.00	283,499.07	296,823.5279	310,774.2337	325,380.6227	340,673.5119	356,685.167
Est Rev Growth		4.70%	4.70%	4.70%	4.70%	4.70%	4.70%
<b>Commercial Aftermarket</b>							
Revenue	205,288.00	210,522.84	217,680.62	225,081.76	232,734.54	240,647.52	248,829.53
Est Rev Growth		3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%
<b>Military Aftermarket</b>							
Revenue	210,662.00	216,349.87	223,705.7697	231,311.7659	239,176.3659	247,308.3624	255,716.8467
Est Rev Growth		3.60%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%	3.40%
<b>Non-Aviation Revenue</b>							
Revenue	46,675.00	48,168.60	49,902.67	51,699.17	53,560.34	55,488.51	57,486.09
Est Rev Growth		3.20%	3.60%	3.60%	3.60%	3.60%	3.60%
<b>Overall Revenue</b>	<b>1,258,829</b>	<b>1,392,275</b>	<b>1,510,787</b>	<b>1,623,652</b>	<b>1,740,815</b>	<b>1,815,172</b>	<b>1,898,105</b>
YoY Growth		14%	9%	7%	7%	4%	5%

## Financial Forecast

Fiscal Year	Mar 2025 LTM	Q3/Q4 2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E
<b>Revenue</b>	<b>\$1,261,962</b>	<b>\$696,137</b>	<b>\$1,510,787</b>	<b>\$1,623,652</b>	<b>\$1,740,815</b>	<b>\$1,815,172</b>	<b>\$1,898,105</b>
Less: COGS	(893,413)	(492,834)	(1,069,570)	(1,149,473)	(1,232,419)	(1,285,061)	(1,343,774)
<b>Gross Profit</b>	<b>\$368,549</b>	<b>\$203,303</b>	<b>\$441,217</b>	<b>\$474,179</b>	<b>\$508,395</b>	<b>\$530,111</b>	<b>\$554,331</b>
% Margin	29.2%	29.2%	29.2%	29.2%	29.2%	29.2%	29.2%
Less: SG&A	(\$168,582)	(\$92,995)	(\$201,822)	(\$216,899)	(\$232,551)	(\$242,484)	(\$253,563)
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>\$199,967</b>	<b>\$110,308</b>	<b>\$239,395</b>	<b>\$257,279</b>	<b>\$275,845</b>	<b>\$287,627</b>	<b>\$300,768</b>
% Margin	15.8%	15.8%	15.8%	15.8%	15.8%	15.8%	15.8%
Less: D&A/Legal Contingencies/Restructuring	(29,587)	(\$31,506)	(\$67,635)	(\$72,037)	(\$76,606)	(\$79,506)	(\$82,740)
<b>EBIT</b>	<b>\$170,380</b>	<b>\$78,802</b>	<b>\$171,760</b>	<b>\$185,243</b>	<b>\$199,239</b>	<b>\$208,121</b>	<b>\$218,028</b>
Less: Interest Expense	(87,628.00)	(59,200)	(109,812)	(108,328)	(104,366)	(99,297)	(92,786)
Less: Revolver Commitment Fee	--	(6,250)	(12,500)	(12,500)	(12,500)	(12,500)	(12,500)
Less: Amortization of Financing Fees	--	(493)	(987)	(987)	(987)	(987)	(987)
<b>EBT</b>	<b>41,445.00</b>	<b>\$12,858</b>	<b>\$48,462</b>	<b>\$63,428</b>	<b>\$81,386</b>	<b>\$95,337</b>	<b>\$111,755</b>
Less: Taxes	(5,589.00)	(1,734)	(6,535)	(8,553)	(10,975)	(12,857)	(15,071)
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>35,856.00</b>	<b>\$11,124</b>	<b>\$41,927</b>	<b>\$54,874</b>	<b>\$70,411</b>	<b>\$82,481</b>	<b>\$96,685</b>
Plus: D&A	29,587	\$31,506	\$67,635	\$72,037	\$76,606	\$79,506	\$82,740
Plus: Amortization of Financing Fees	--	493	987	987	987	987	987
Less: Unwind of Deferred Tax Liability	--	(915)	(1,830)	(1,830)	(1,830)	(1,830)	(1,830)
Less: Capex	(19,056.00)	(10,512)	(45,324)	(48,710)	(52,224)	(54,455)	(56,943)
Less: (Increase) / Decrease in NWC	(46,800.00)	(15,851)	(21,790)	(20,751)	(21,542)	(13,671)	(15,248)
<b>Free Cash Flow (Before Debt Paydown)</b>	<b>18,830.00</b>	<b>\$15,847</b>	<b>\$41,605</b>	<b>\$56,607</b>	<b>\$72,408</b>	<b>\$93,017</b>	<b>\$106,390</b>
Less: Optional Borrowing / (Repayment)		(15,847)	(41,605)	(56,607)	(72,408)	(93,017)	(106,390)
<b>Cash Flow</b>	<b>(115,350.00)</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>--</b>

## Operating Assumptions

COGS % of Revenue	71%	71%	71%	71%	71%	71%	71%
SG&A % of Revenue (incl R&D)	13.4%	13.4%	13.4%	13.4%	13.4%	13.4%	13.4%
D&A % of Revenue	4%	4.5%	4.5%	4.4%	4.4%	4.4%	4.4%
Capex % of Revenue	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
NWC % of Revenue	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%
Revenue Growth %	--	14%	9%	7%	7%	4%	5%
Tax Rate %	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%

## Debt Schedule

	SOFR Curve		4.0%	3.5%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%
Fiscal Year			Q3/Q4 2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E
<b>Cash Available for Revolver Paydown</b>			<b>\$15,847</b>	<b>\$41,605</b>	<b>\$56,607</b>	<b>\$72,408</b>	<b>\$93,017</b>	<b>\$106,390</b>
<b>Revolver</b>								
Beginning Balance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Optional Borrowing / (Repayment)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<b>Ending Balance</b>	<b>Floor</b>	<b>Rate</b>	--	--	--	--	--	--
Interest Rate	4.0%	SOFR + 4	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%
Interest Expense	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maximum Capacity			\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000
Available Capacity			\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000
<b>Cash Available for Term Loan Paydown</b>			\$15,847	\$41,605	\$56,607	\$72,408	\$93,017	\$106,390
<b>Term Loan (incl. Delayed Draw Term Loan)</b>								
Beginning Balance (Repayment)			\$1,480,000	\$1,464,153	\$1,547,548	\$1,490,942	\$1,418,534	\$1,325,517
Interest Rate	4.0%	SOFR + 4	8.0%	7.5%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%
Interest Expense			\$58,566	\$106,691	\$104,366	\$99,297	\$92,786	\$85,339
<b>Total Interest Expense + Amortization</b>			<b>\$59,059</b>	<b>\$107,678</b>	<b>\$105,353</b>	<b>\$100,284</b>	<b>\$93,773</b>	<b>\$86,326</b>
<b>Interest Calculation</b>								
Revolver	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Term Loan (incl. Delayed Draw Term Loan)			58,566	106,691	104,366	99,297	92,786	85,339
<b>Total Interest Expense</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Yrs</b>	<b>\$58,566</b>	<b>\$106,691</b>	<b>\$104,366</b>	<b>\$99,297</b>	<b>\$92,786</b>	<b>\$85,339</b>
Amortization of Financing Fees	\$14,800	15 Years	\$493	\$987	\$987	\$987	\$987	\$987

## Balance Sheet

Fiscal Year	Txn	Q3/Q4 2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E
Cash	\$169,919	\$169,919	\$169,919	\$169,919	\$169,919	\$169,919	\$169,919
Accounts Receivable	154,888	176,780	191,828	206,159	221,035	230,477	241,007
Inventory	357,323	407,828	442,543	475,604	509,924	531,704	555,997
Prepaid Expenses	19,736	22,526	24,443	26,269	28,165	29,368	30,709
<b>Total Current Assets</b>	<b>\$701,866</b>	<b>\$777,054</b>	<b>\$828,734</b>	<b>\$877,951</b>	<b>\$929,043</b>	<b>\$961,468</b>	<b>\$997,633</b>
Property, Plant & Equipment	\$154,538	\$176,381	\$191,395	\$205,693	\$220,536	\$229,956	\$240,462
Goodwill	2,456,113	2,456,113	2,456,113	2,456,113	2,456,113	2,456,113	2,456,113
Intangible Assets	186,905	178,191	169,476	160,762	152,048	143,334	134,619
<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>\$3,499,422</b>	<b>\$3,587,738</b>	<b>\$3,645,718</b>	<b>\$3,700,520</b>	<b>\$3,757,740</b>	<b>\$3,790,871</b>	<b>\$3,828,828</b>
Accounts Payable	\$162,917	\$185,944	\$201,772	\$216,846	\$232,493	\$242,424	\$253,500
Accrued Liabilities	144,747	\$165,206	\$179,269	\$192,661	\$206,564	\$215,387	\$225,227
<b>Total Current Liabilities</b>	<b>\$307,664</b>	<b>\$351,150</b>	<b>\$381,041</b>	<b>\$409,507</b>	<b>\$439,057</b>	<b>\$457,811</b>	<b>\$478,728</b>
Revolver	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Term Loan (Ind Delayed Draw Term Loan)	1,480,000	1,464,153	1,422,548	1,490,942	1,418,534	1,325,517	1,219,127
<b>Total Debt</b>	<b>\$1,480,000</b>	<b>\$1,464,153</b>	<b>\$1,422,548</b>	<b>\$1,490,942</b>	<b>\$1,418,534</b>	<b>\$1,325,517</b>	<b>\$1,219,127</b>
% of Initial Debt	98.9%	96.1%	100.7%	95.8%	89.6%	82.4%	
<b>Total Net Debt</b>	<b>\$1,310,081</b>	<b>\$1,294,234</b>	<b>\$1,252,629</b>	<b>\$1,321,022</b>	<b>\$1,248,615</b>	<b>\$1,155,598</b>	<b>\$1,049,208</b>
<b>Total Debt / EBITDA</b>	<b>7.4x</b>	<b>13.3x</b>	<b>5.9x</b>	<b>5.8x</b>	<b>5.1x</b>	<b>4.6x</b>	<b>4.1x</b>
<b>Total Net Debt / EBITDA</b>	<b>6.6x</b>	<b>11.7x</b>	<b>5.2x</b>	<b>5.1x</b>	<b>4.5x</b>	<b>4.0x</b>	<b>3.5x</b>
Capitalized Financing Fees	\$37,100	36,607	35,620	34,633	33,647	32,660	31,673
Deferred Tax Liability	\$27,450	\$26,535	\$24,705	\$22,875	\$21,045	\$19,215	\$17,385
Shareholder Equity	\$1,647,208	\$1,709,293	\$1,781,804	\$1,742,563	\$1,845,457	\$1,955,668	\$2,081,915
<b>Total Liabilities and Equity</b>	<b>\$3,499,422</b>	<b>\$3,587,738</b>	<b>\$3,645,718</b>	<b>\$3,700,520</b>	<b>\$3,757,740</b>	<b>\$3,790,871</b>	<b>\$3,828,828</b>
Check	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<b>Working Capital</b>							
Current Assets (excl. Cash)	\$531,947	\$607,134	\$658,814	\$708,032	\$759,124	\$791,549	\$827,714
Current Liabilities	307,664	351,150	381,041	409,507	439,057	457,811	478,728
<b>Working Capital</b>	<b>\$224,283</b>	<b>\$255,984</b>	<b>\$277,774</b>	<b>\$298,525</b>	<b>\$320,067</b>	<b>\$333,738</b>	<b>\$348,986</b>
<b>Change in Working Capital</b>		31,701	21,790	20,751	21,542	13,671	15,248

## Returns Calculation

Fiscal Year	Q3/Q4 2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E
<b>LTM EBITDA</b>	<b>\$110,308</b>	<b>\$239,395</b>	<b>\$257,279</b>	<b>\$275,845</b>	<b>\$287,627</b>	<b>\$300,768</b>
(x) Exit Multiple	16.6x	16.6x	16.6x	16.6x	16.6x	16.6x
<b>Total Enterprise Value</b>	<b>\$1,831,113</b>	<b>\$3,973,959</b>	<b>\$4,270,838</b>	<b>\$4,579,022</b>	<b>\$4,774,610</b>	<b>\$4,992,756</b>
Less: Net Debt	(1,294,234)	(1,252,629)	(1,321,022)	(1,248,615)	(1,155,598)	(1,049,208)
<b>Equity Value</b>	<b>\$536,879</b>	<b>\$2,721,330</b>	<b>\$2,949,815</b>	<b>\$3,330,407</b>	<b>\$3,619,012</b>	<b>\$3,943,548</b>
Year	7/1/2025	12/31/2026	12/31/2027	12/30/2028	12/30/2029	12/30/2030
Cashflow	(\$1,762,880)					\$3,943,548
<b>IRR</b>						<b>15.8%</b>
<b>MoM</b>						<b>2.2x</b>

## Sensitivity Tables

IRR					MoM						
EBITDA Margin	Average Revenue Growth				EBITDA Margin	Average Revenue Growth					
	7%	9%	11%	13%		7%	9%	11%	13%		
15%	13.3%	14.0%	14.6%	15.2%	15.8%	14%	1.75	1.81	1.87	1.93	1.99
16%	15.3%	16.0%	16.6%	17.2%	17.8%	15%	1.98	2.04	2.10	2.17	2.23
17%	17.4%	18.0%	18.6%	19.2%	19.8%	16%	2.20	2.27	2.34	2.41	2.47
18%	19.5%	20.1%	20.7%	21.3%	21.9%	17%	2.43	2.50	2.57	2.64	2.72
19%	21.3%	21.9%	22.5%	23.1%	23.7%	18%	2.65	2.73	2.81	2.88	2.96